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IN TilE UTAH COURT OF APPEAlS

BRIAN T. MURPHY and
SHELLY F. MURPHY,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

vs.

Case No. 930249-CA
Priority 15

CROSLAND INDUSTRIES, INC.; a
defunct Utah corporation, formally
dba GRANNY'S BUNS, INC., a Utah
corporation; TODD CROSLAND;
JEFF CROSLAND and REX
CROSLAND
Defendant, Appellees,
and Cross-Appellant.

BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELlANT JEFF CROSlAND

APPELlATE COURT JURISDICTION
This appeal was poured over from the Utah Supreme Court on August 26, 1993,
and, therefore, this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue One: ·whether the trial court erred by holding that a person who executes
a guaranty on behalf of a corporation in his representative capacity as an officer of the
corporation, is personally liable for the guaranty when the guaranty was executed while
the corporation was suspended, but before dissolution.
1

Standard of Review: The trial court's ruling is a question of law, thereby invoking
a correction of error standard. Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1192 (Utah 1993).
Issue Two: Whether the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki's refusal to reconsider the
Honorable Scott Daniel's order granting summary judgment against Jeff Crosland was an
abuse of discretion, where Judge Daniel's order granting summary judgment was based
upon application of the wrong version of the applicable statutory provision and was,
therefore, an error of law.
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1365
(Utah 1988).
Issue Three: Whether the trial court erred by entering an award of damages
against Jeff Crosland without a trial or .a summary judgment motion directed to the issue
of damages.
Standard of Review: Correction of Error. Baldwin, 850 P.2d at 1192.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-88.2(1), (2)(d) (as amended March 10, 1987)
primary determinative statute in this matter, and provides as follows:
(1) A domestic corporation that remains delinquent for more than 30 days
after the mailing of the notice of delinquency under Section 16-10-88.1 shall
be suspended. If a corporation is suspended under this section or under
Section 59-7-155, the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall
mail a notice of suspension to the corporation, unless the corporation's
certificate of incorporation is already suspended for any reason.
(2) A notice of suspension shall state:

2

IS

the

* * * *

(d) that the corporation may remove the suspension by
correcting the delinquency and paying a reinstatement fee
determined by the Division of Corporations and Commercial
Code pursuant to Subsection 63-38-3 (2), in addition to any
fees required by Section 16-10-124, or, if its certificate of
incorporation bas been suspended under Section 59-7-157; .

Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-139 is also determinative in this matter, and provides as
follows:
All persons who assume to act as a corporation without authority so to do
shall be jointly and severally liable for all debts and liabilities incurred or
arising as a result thereof.
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-88.2(1) (as amended March 8, 1990) is also relevant to
this matter, but is not determinative inasmuch as the amendment was not in effect at the
time of the events at issue in this matter. Section 16-10-88.2 (as amended March 8, 1990)
provides:
A domestic corporation that remains delinquent for more than 30 days after
the mailing of the notice of delinquency under Section 16-10-88.1 shall be
suspended. If a corporation is suspended under this section or under
Section 59-7-155, the division shall mail a notice of suspension to the
corporation, unless the corporation's certificate of incorporation is already
suspended for any reason. A corporation that is suspended continues its
corporate existence and may carry on any business so long as it also takes
the necessary steps to remedy its suspended status and restore the
corporation to good standing.
Utah Code Ann.§ 16-10-88.2(1) (as amended March 20, 1990)(emphasis addedreflecting the language added to the statute).
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STA1EMENT OF 11IE CASE
Nature of the Case.

This is an action on a guaranty executed by defendant

Crosland Industries, Inc. ("CI").

Having been unsuccessful in recovering from CI,

appellants/cross-appellees seek to impose personal liability upon cross-appellant Jeff
Crosland and other principals of Cl.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. The amended complaint was filed
on June 4, 1990. On March 26, 1991, the Honorable Scott Daniels, the trial judge then
assigned to this case, granted summary judgment as to liability against Jeff Crosland. The
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki was subsequently assigned to this case and on November 13,
1992, granted summary judgment in favor of Todd Crosland. On November 20, 1992, Jeff
Crosland filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting summary judgment
against him, which motion was denied by the trial court on February 18, 1993.
On March 8, 1993, Jeff Crosland filed an objection to the judgment asserting, inter
alia, that the judgment failed to establish damages against him and, absent a
determination of damages, the judgment was not final.

On March 9, 1993, without

receiving any evidence to establish any basis for an amount of damages, the trial court
entered judgment against Jeff Crosland in the amount of $72,978.46, together with interest
in the amount of $26,816.58 and attorney fees.
On March 18, 1993, plaintiffs/cross-appellees filed their notice of appeal, appealing
the order granting summary judgment in favor of Todd Crosland.
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On March 19, 1993, Jeff Crosland filed a motion to amend judgment or grant new
trial, pursuant to Rule 59, Utah R. Civ. P., which motion was denied on May 25, 1993.
Jeff Crosland filed his notice of appeal on May 28, 1993. 1
STA1EMENT OF FACfS
1.

Defendant Crosland Industries, Inc. ("CI") was lawfully incorporated on

January 28, 1986, under the laws of the State of Utah and was issued a Certificate of
Incorporation. (R. at 269).

2.

Defendant/cross-appellant Jeff Crosland ("Jeff Crosland") was the vice

president and a director of CI. (R. at 210).
3.

On March 1, 1987, CI was suspended pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-

88.2. (R. at 210).
4.

On January 8, 1988, plaintiffs Brian and Shelly Murphy (the "Murphys")

entered into a contract of purchase and sale with Arnold Swenson ("Swenson") by which
Swenson agreed to purchase from the Murphys a business known as Granny's Buns, which
was located in Las Vegas, Nevada. The agreed purchase price was $70,000. (R. at 210).

1Jeff Crosland and the Murphys ftled separate appeals, which appeals were consolidated by
the Utah Supreme Court and poured over to this Court on August 26, 1993. Although the issues
raised in the separate appeals are, to a certain extent, related and overlap, Jeff Crosland is not an
appellee with respect to the Murphys' appeal and, therefore, is not responding to the Murphys'
Brief of Appellant. Rather, Jeff Crosland is solely a cross-appellant due to the consolidations and
pour over. However, as per instructions received from the office of the Clerk of the Court of
Appeals, Jeff Crosland is submitting the instant brief under a red cover, although Jeff Crosland
is a cross-appellant only, and not an appellee.
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5.

Swenson executed a promissory note (the "Note") in favor of the Murphys

in the amount of $70,000.00 and a security agreement. (R. at 210).

6.

On January 8, 1988, CI executed a guaranty (the "Guaranty") of the Note.

The Guaranty was executed by Jeff Crosland in his representative capacity as vice
president of CI. (R. at 210).

7.

At the time Jeff Crosland executed the Guaranty on behalf of CI, Jeff

Crosland was unaware that CI had been suspended by the State of Utah. (R. at 539:4-6).

8.

On March 1, 1988, CI was dissolved as a corporation. (R. at 210).

9.

Swenson subsequently defaulted on the Note and the purchase contract. (R.

10.

On July 27, 1989, the Murphys obtained a default judgment against CI based

at 82).

on the Guaranty in the amount of $72,987.46, plus interest at the rate of ten percent

11.

The Murphys commenced this action on February 27, 1988, and filed an

amended complaint on June 11, 1988. (R.2, 45).

12.

On March 26, 1991, the Honorable Scott Daniels, the trial judge then

assigned to this case, granted summary judgment in favor

1 ,;

' 1c

'Jphys and against Jeff

Crosland based upon Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10-88.2, 16-10-139 (as amended March 8,

19901 (R. 178).

13.

On October 14, 1992, TrJdd Crosland

as to each of the Murphys' causes of action. (R. 206-07).

6

l>'ir;n

f,H sununary judgment

14.

A hearing on Todd Crosland's motion for summary judgment was held on

November 5, 1993. (See R. at 531-53). At that hearing, the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki
expressly held that CI was a de jure corporation. Specifically, Judge Iwasaki stated:
There seems to be no doubt this was a de jure corporation. This was not
one in which the piercing of the corporate vail need be done.
(R. at 549:14-16)(emphasis added).
15.

On November 13, 1992, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor

of Todd Crosland. (R. at 314).
16.

On November 20, 1992, Jeff Crosland filed a motion for reconsideration of

the order granting summary judgment against him. Similarly, on December 3, 1992, the
Murphys sought reconsideration of the trial court's order granting summary judgment in
favor of Todd Crosland. (R. at 332).
17.

A hearing on the motions for reconsideration was held on January 15, 1993.

(See R. at 554-566). At that hearing, with respect to the apparent conflict between his
order granting summary judgment in favor of Todd Crosland and Judge Daniels' prior
order granting summary judgment against Jeff Crosland, the trial court stated:
... Either I'm right or Judge Daniels is right and it is going to be for the
appellate court to decide. . . . But I am not going to reconsider Judge
Daniels' previous order. That was done for whatever reason he wishes to
state or he did state. His ruling will remain as will mine, although,
apparently some conflict as to the two rulings. But as I indicated, the
appellate court will decide that as to Mr. Mitchell's motion to reconsider.
(R. at 563:22-564:8)(emphasis added).
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18.

The trial court refused to reconsider Judge Daniels' order granting summary

judgment against Jeff Crosland (R. at 564), and denied the Murphys' motion to reconsider.

(R. at 397).

19.

On March 8, 1993, Jeff Crosland filed an objection to the judgment

asserting, inter alia, that the judgment failed to establish damages against him and, absent
a determination of damages, the judgment was not final. (R. at 403).

20.

On March 9, 1993, without receiving any evidence to establish any basis for

an amount of damages, the trial court entered judgment against Jeff Crosland in the
amount of $72,978.46, together with interest in the amount of $26,816.58 and attorney
fees. (R. at 49, 111).

21.

On March 18, 1993, the Murphys filed a notice of appeal as to the summary

judgment in favor of Todd Crosland. 2 (R. at 423).
22.

On March 19, 1993, Jeff Crosland filed a motion to amend the judgment or

for new trial (R. at 425), which motion was denied on May 25, 1993. (R. at 464 ). Jeff
Crosland filed his notice of appeal on May 28, 1993. (R. at 468).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Judge Daniel's order granting summary judgment against Jeff Crosland is based
upon the wrong version of the applicable statutes. Furthermore, the Honorable Glenn

2Jeff Crosland notes that because the Murphys filed their notice of appeal before the trial
court entered an order with respect to Jeff Crosland's motion to amend judgment or for new trial,
the Murphys' notice of appeal is not valid and this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the Murphys'
appeal.
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K. Iwasaki has held that at the time Jeff Crosland executed the Guaranty, CI was a de

jure corporation. Under Utah law, a corporate principal is not liable for the debts and
obligations of a de jure corporation and, therefore, Jeff Crosland cannot be held
individually liable for the guaranty which he executed solely in his representative capacity
as vice president of CI.
Despite the fact that Judge Daniels' order granting summary judgment against Jeff
Crosland is based on the wrong version of the applicable statute, and despite the fact that
Judge Iwasaki recognized the conflicting nature of the respective judgments now at issue
before this Court, Judge Iwasaki refused to reconsider Judge Daniels' prior order. Such
refusal constitutes an abuse of discretion.
At no time was any evidence of any kind ever offered in the trial court against Jeff
Crosland as to the issue of damages. Accordingly, the trial court's award of damages
against Jeff Crosland is erroneous and Jeff Crosland is entitled to a trial on the issue of
damages.
ARGUMENT
I.

TilE 1RIAL COURT ERRED IN HOlDING THAT A PERSON WHO
EXECUTES A GUARANTY IN HIS REPRESENTATIVE CAPACTIY
AS AN OFFICER OF TIIE CORPORATION IS PERSONALLY LIABLE
ON TIIE GUARANTY

As a threshold matter, Jeff Crosland notes that the trial court has held that at the
time Jeff Crosland executed the Guaranty, CI had not been dissolved and was a de jure
corporation.

(R. at 549: 14-16).

Therefore, the primary question on this appeal is

9

whether, under Utah law as it existed on January 8, 1988, a person who executes a
guaranty in his representative capacity as an officer of a suspended corporation, but prior
to dissolution, is personally liable under the guaranty. 3
A

The Trial Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment Against
Jeff Crosland Is Based Upon The Wrong Version Of Utah
Code Ann. § 16-10-882(1).

The order granting summary judgment against Jeff Crosland is based upon the
wrong version of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-88.2(1). At the time Judge Daniels entered
summary judgment against Jeff Crosland, all parties and the trial court relied upon the
following version of Utah Code Ann.§ 16-10-88.2(1) as the controlling statutory authority:

A domestic corporation that remains delinquent for more than 30 days after
the mailing of the notice of delinquency under Section 16-10-88.1 shall be
suspended. If a corporation is suspended under this section or under
Section 59-7-155, the division shall mail a notice of suspension to the
corporation, unless the corporation's certificate of incorporation is already
suspended for any reason. A corporation that is suspended continues its
corporate existence and may carry on any business so long as it also takes
the necessary steps to remedy its suspended status and restore the
corporation to good standing.
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-88.2(1) (as amended March 20, 1990)(emphasis added).
However, the requirement, if it exists in the language of the statute, to take "necessary
steps to remedy its suspended status and restore the corporation to good standing" was
not passed by the Legislature until 1990, after the events at issue in this case. (See R. at
432-34). The applicable version of§ 16-10-88.2(1) in effect at the time of the events

3As

indicated, the trial court has held that CI had not dissolved and was a de jure corporation
on January 8, 1988, the date upon which Jeff Crosland executed the Guaranty.
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subject of this litigation contained no requirement for a corporation to remedy its
suspended status and in no way affected the de jure status of a corporation until
dissolution. 4 (See R. at 435-37). The notice of suspension under the old statute was
simply a precursor to a later dissolution, which, at that time, would result in the
corporation's loss of de jure statute. Yet in the case at bar, the trial court has determined
that CI was, until the time of dissolution, a de jure corporation.

(R. at 549:14-16).

Because CI was a de jure corporation at the time Jeff Crosland executed the Guaranty
in his representative capacity as vice president of CI, and the requirement of
reinstatement from suspension, to protect corporate officers, directors and/or shareholders
from creditors of the corporation did not exist, there was an error in law that the trial
court was obligated to correct once the error was discovered.

B.

Principles Of Statutory Construction Make Clear That The
1990 Amendment Operated To Change Existing Law.

The Murphys argue, both to the trial court below and in their Reply to Brief of
Appellee Todd Crosland ("Murphys Reply Brief'), that the 1990 amendment relied upon
by Judge Daniels was merely a codification of the common law. See Murphys Reply Brief
at 17. This contention ignores principles of statutory construction, is based on the false
premise that "suspension" under the Utah Code operated to diminish the powers of a

4The 1990 version of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-88.2(1)

was repealed and replaced with the
Revised Business Corporation Act after the accrual of the Murphys' claims. See Laws 1992, Ch.
227 § 248, effective July 1. 1992.
The present provisions appear in the Revised Business
Corporation Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10a-101, et seq., effective July 1, 1992. The provisions
in effect on January 8, 1988. however, govern this appeal. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-5.
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corporation, and is an unsupported leap to the conclusion that corporate officers are
personally liable for executing a corporate guaranty during the period of suspension. The
Murphys' contentions fail on all counts.
Under the law in effect at the time of the transaction in question in this case, there
is no statutory provision requiring that a corporation take "the necessary steps to remedy
its suspended status and restore the corporation to good standing" in order to carry on its
business which appears in the amendment relied upon by Judge Daniels. (See R. at 43537). In interpreting such an amendment, the appropriate rule of construction is set forth
in Hirsh v. Ogden Furniture & Carpet Co., 51 Utah 558, 172 P. 318 (1918). In Hirsh, the
court concluded that a prior statute had no requirement for notice based upon an
intervening amendment which added a requirement for service of notice. Id. at 319. The
court concluded as follows:
If service of notice had thus been required under the statute as it
stood, it would have been a useless ceremony to have amended it.
Clearly the legislative construction was that the old statute did not
require notice, and therefore they amended it so that service of
notice was required.

Id. Likewise, here, there was no requirement of reinstatement of a suspended corporation
in the applicable law. The legislature necessarily construed the statute the same way as
is shown by their addition of that requirement in the 1990 amendment. "[I]t would have
been a useless ceremony to have amended" the statute if the law already contained that
requirement. See id.
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This interpretation also is mandated by N. Singer, Statutes and Statutory
Construction ["Sutherland Statutory Construction"], which states: "[A]ny material change
in the language of the original act is presumed to indicate a change in legal rights ....
Thus, in interpreting an amendatory act there is a presumption of change in legal rights.
This is a rule peculiar to amendments and other acts purporting to change the existing
statutory law." Sutherland Statutory Construction§ 22.30 (4th ed. 1985 Rev.) (emphasis
added).
C.

The Murphys' Argument As To The Effect Of Suspension Is
Not Supported By Applicable Utah Law.

In the Brief of Appellants, the Murphys rely upon Rocky Mountain Sales &
Service, Inc. v. Havana RV, Inc., 635 P.2d 935 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991), for the proposition
that a Utah corporation under suspension cannot conduct business. That Colorado case
relied upon Dominion Oil Co. v. Lamb, 201 P.2d 372 (Colo. 1948) (en bane). Dominion
Oil Co. explains the basis for the Colorado decisions as relying upon a specific Colorado
statute:
Chapter 41, section 83, '35 C.S.A. Supp., provides that a corporation
which fails to pay its annual corporation license taxes and other fees
required by law, shall, after publication of a list of such corporations
by the secretary of state and upon proof thereof being filed with such
secretary, "be deemed defunct and inoperative and no longer
competent to transact business within the state of Colorado * * *."
Id. at 374. No statute in Utah exists which mandates that a de jure corporation "be
deemed defunct and inoperative and no longer competent to transact business within the
state of' Utah upon a suspension under Section 16-10-88.2. Therefore, the Colorado cases
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cited by plaintiffs are inapposite, as being based upon Colorado statutes which do not
have Utah equivalents.
The Murphys also rely upon 19 Am. Jur. 2d, Corporations § 2825 (1986). See Brief
of Appellants at 7. However, nothing in the portion relied upon by the Murphys would
impose personal liability upon Jeff Crosland. In fact, the case relied upon by Am. Jur.
for the phrase quoted by the Murphys does not stand for any proposition such as the one
argued by the Murphys to this Court. Instead, where a corporation had entered into a
contract during a period of suspension, and sought to enforce the contract during the time
of suspension, the case relied upon by Am. Jur. stated as follows:
We hold that, so long as its corporate powers are suspended, a
corporation may not affirmatively enforce contracts which it entered
into during the period when its powers were suspended.
Kupski v. Bal Investment Co., 35 Mich. App. 680, 192 N.W.2d 519, 522 (1971). This is
a far cry from imposing personal liability upon an officer of a de jure corporation, the
proposition for which the Murphys argued the Am. Jur. quotation stands.
Moreover, Murphys have failed to quote the next-following, but even more
applicable sentence out of Am. Jur.:
But the corporation may dispose of its property during this period.
19 Am. Jur. 2d, Corporations§ 2825 (1986). In this case, the execution by the corporation
of a guaranty constituted nothing more than a disposition of its property which it was able
to do. The guaranty did nothing more and nothing less than pledge CI corporate assets
to satisfy the loan obligation of Swenson upon a default by Swenson. This construction is
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also supported by the case cited by Am. Jur., Furstenberg Bros. v. Township of Carrollton,
61 Mich. App. 230, 232 N.W.2d 372 (1975). In Furstenberg Bros., defendants challenged
the validity of an assignment agreement entered into by the suspended plaintiffcorporation. The Michigan Court of Appeals noted that an assignment amounted to
nothing more than a disposition or conveyance of property as to which a suspended
corporation is entitled to proceed.

Plaintiffs fail to explain how the execution of a

corporate guaranty, which does nothing more in substance than pledge the assets of the
corporation to satisfy the indebtedness of the principal obligor, could be viewed any
differently.
In any event, the corporate suspensiOn statutes relied upon in Colorado and
Michigan are not found in the applicable version of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-88.2. It is
only after the 1990 amendment that the statute purports to require a reinstatement after
a suspended status. During the applicable time period, as to the conduct of business, the
only provision of Section 16-10-88.2 which addressed the issue of inability to conduct
business arose after dissolution and stated:
The dissolution of any corporation precludes that corporation from
doing business in its corporate character under any name or assumed
names filed on behalf of the dissolved corporation under Section 422-5.
(See R. at 437). The corporate status was not affected by a suspension under Section 1610-88.2, the notice of suspension did not set forth any effect of suspension, and the only
effect of suspension under the statute was to provide notice that the corporation would
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be dissolved one year from the date of mailing the notice of suspension unless the
corporation removed the suspension before that time. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-88.2(2)( e).
Further, while the Murphys cite to Gillham Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Ipson, 567
P.2d 163 (Utah 1977), for their proposition that a suspended corporation has no power
and is incompetent to enter into valid contracts such as the one at issue in the case at bar,
that citation is somewhat misleading. The holding of personal liability upon the defendant
in Gillham Advertising Agency was not premised upon any notion of corporate suspension,
but rather was premised upon the court's holding that "there was no such corporation of
which [defendant] was president." Gillham Advertising Agency, 567 P.2d at 165. In other
words, no de jure corporation existed.
Nor is the Murphys' reliance on Section 16-10-139 well-placed. As was pointed out
in the dissent in the Gillham Advertising Agency case, that provision is identical to
Section 146 of the Model Business Corporations Act which "is designed to prohibit the
application of any theory of de facto incorporation." Gillham Advertising Agency v. Ipson,
567 P.2d 163, 165-66 (Utah 1977) (Maughn, J., dissenting).

CI, even if suspended,

remained a de jure corporation until dissolution, and thereafter while winding up. See
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-101 (1987 Repl. Vol. & Supp. 1988). Further, a review of the
Model Business Corporations Act discloses that that Act contains no provision for
suspension such as existed under the applicable version of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-88.2.
Moreover, CI was not a de facto corporation, such that Section 16-10-139 would have any
application, but was a de jure corporation, as the trial court has so held. (See R. at
16

549:14-16). Having remained a de jure corporation until dissolution and winding up, there
is no individual liability to be imposed on any person by virtue of the giving of a
corporate guaranty.

In fact, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the authority of a corporate
officer to act on behalf of the corporation "die[s] with the corporation." Houston v. Utah
Lake Land, Water & Power Co., 55 Utah 393, 187 P. 174 (1919). Thus, until the "death"
of the corporation, by dissolution, a corporate officer is empowered to act on a
corporation's behalf, at least under the applicable law.

D.

TilE 1RlAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO

RECONSIDER JUDGE DANIELS' PRIOR ORDER
Utah R. Civ. P. 59( a) allows a new trial or amendment of a judgment on grounds
that the judgment is against law or was based on an error in law.
59(a)(6)-(7).

Utah R. Civ. P.

Regardless of whether the Murphys are correct in their assertion that

defendants first mistakenly argued the wrong law, none of the parties to this action nor
the Court noted that the law argued had not become effective until 1990. Once it was
discovered that Judge Daniels' prior order was based upon the wrong statutory provision,
the trial court had a duty to reconsider that prior order and to correct the error of law
that had been made. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59 (a)(7). Failure to so do constitutes an abuse
of discretion and is reversible error. Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1365 (Utah 1988).
The law is the law. Neither defendants' nor plaintiffs' arguments concerning the
law alters its existence or effect. Regardless of the arguments, Judge Daniels, in rendering
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his decision against Jeff Crosland, relied upon a statute which was not in effect at the
time of the transaction and therefore not applicable. The correct law appears in the
Record at pages 435-37. Judge Daniels' decision against Jeff Crosland is clearly based
upon an "error in law" as that phrase is used in Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(7), because it is
expressly premised upon law which did not exist at the time of the transaction in question.
Moreover, Judge Iwasaki expressly held that CI was a de jure corporation, thus making
it impossible for Jeff Crosland to be individually liable. Therefore, the trial court erred
as a matter of law in failing to reconsider Judge Daniels' ruling.
The Murphys' apparent argument that statutory law can be established between the
parties to litigation by virtue of who makes the first argument is unsupported. Having
disclosed an error in law, the trial court had the duty to examine that error to determine
the entitlement of Jeff Crosland to an amendment of judgment or new trial. Failure to
fulfill that duty is an abuse of discretion and constitutes reversible error.

ID.

1HE TRIAL COURTS ENlRY OF DAMAGES AGAINST JEFF
CROSLAND IS CLEAR ERROR WHERE NO EVIDENCE WAS EVER
OFFERED AGAINST JEFF CROSLAND ON 1HE ISSUE OF
DAMAGES
There has never been one shred of evidence offered against Jeff Crosland on the

issue of damages. Rather, the only basis upon which the trial court awarded an amount
of damages was the default judgment which had been entered against CI in a separate
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action to which Jeff Crosland was not a party. 5 Yet the law is clear that the fact that
the Murphys have taken a default judgment against the corporation does not entitle them
to forego putting on proof of their damages as against Jeff Crosland, and clearly violates
well-established notions of due process. See Tintic Indian Chief Mining & Milling Co.

v. Clvdt.:, ;,,

'

'

portion of the judgment against Jcf;· Crosland

rm~st

.,,: :-eversed and remanded tot[ c

tr~al

CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment against Jeff Crosland should be
reversed, and the trial court should be directed to enter an order dismissing, with
prejudice, the Murphvs' claims against Jeff Crosland. Alternativelv. the damages oortion
uf the ·

Er:ient should be reversed and this matter remanded
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damages.
Respectful~\ .-iJt:•llililccL

a Lrial

DATED this

_a_:jh day of November, 1993.
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS
310 South Main Street, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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